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Dynamics of Corporate Governance and Tax Avoidance in Pakistan Family-Owned Firms

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the causal relationship between Corporate Governance (CG) and Tax Avoidance (TA) in family-owned firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) over the period from 2013 to 2022. Data is collected from the PSX official website and annual reports to examine CG proxies and TA relationships employing a random effects model while accounting for heteroskedasticity to test various hypotheses. The results reveal that specific aspects of corporate governance significantly influence tax avoidance practices in family-owned firms. Board size, CEO duality, institutional shareholding, and insider shareholding exhibit an inverse relationship with tax avoidance. This suggests that family-owned firms with larger boards, separate CEO and chairperson roles, increased institutional investor presence, and reduced insider ownership tend to engage in less tax avoidance. The study highlights the implications of these findings for corporate governance and tax avoidance strategies and underscores the importance of promoting transparency and ethical financial practices in family-owned firms.

1. Introduction

For more than a decade, several academics have focused on the strict corporate governance (CG) policies found in family enterprises (Hassan et al., 2022), where several family generations, connected through blood, marriage, or adaption, influence decision-making and have the power to drive the organization towards specific goals. According to the research conducted by Biswas et al. (2019), applying good CG practices in family businesses is important because it achieves the primary goal of promoting accountability, full disclosure of information, fairness, and transparency, which are essential for the business's success.

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TA refers to actions taken in tax planning to reduce taxable income or tax liabilities (Khan et al., 2022). Among two central CG mechanisms, the corporate control market, legal systems, and stock market are examples of the outside; the board of directors, management compensation, remuneration and audit committee, and ownership structure are examples of the insiders. Salhi et al. (2020) contend that internal control is one of the leading CG strategies that BODs employ to lower the level of TA risk in the company. Research has also shown that well-managed businesses with an appropriate internal control system are less likely to engage in TA activities (Khan et al., 2022).

CG plays a crucial role in shaping the actions and choices made by enterprises using many frameworks and instruments designed to ensure accountability, transparency, and the protection of stakeholder's interests. Even so, there is a lack of comprehensive research analyzing the relationship between TA and CG factors, particularly in family enterprises. Family firms comprise a sizable portion of the world economy and usually exhibit distinguishing characteristics that could impact their CG frameworks and TA strategies (Setiawan, 2023). For academic research and practical applications, it is necessary to comprehend the association's focus on CG determinants and TA in family enterprises. It is currently unclear how ownership concentration, board structure, family engagement, and succession planning impact these companies' TA practices. The potential conflicts over ownership division and business interests further complicate this connection (Choi & Park, 2022). A few other distinctive characteristics and governance structures of these companies include agency conflicts, proprietorships, and the separation of administration and ownership. These businesses also present particular dynamics that may influence how they handle tax planning, which may raise concerns about these factors' potential impacts on TA practices. To address these issues and provide policymakers with significant implications and recommendations for the interested parties of family firms, such as investors (shareholders), managers, and owners, the current study aims to examine the direct impact of CG determinants on TA from the perspectives of family firms.

The literature has argued that most studies on the CG-TA relationships have only examined the relationships within developed countries. As a result, there is a need to investigate the relationships that have received less attention in developing countries (Khan et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2020). As per the researcher's best knowledge, the current study model has not been investigated comprehensively. In the case of the CG-TA relationship, no research has been done on the direct impact of CG on TA for family firms. Widyastuti et al. (2022) examined non-financial firms in Indonesia, while Almaqtari et al. (2022) examined Indian financial institutions in their relationship investigation.

The latest study examines the GC-TA relationship while offering essential policy implications and recommendations to relevant stakeholders, including Pakistan family firm managers, government agencies, prospective researchers, and investors (shareholders). Additionally, considering the agency theory perspective put forth by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the research will help pressure top executives and managers to strengthen their internal control CG system to work for the best interests of stockholders and governmental bodies rather than be involved in TA activities. Finally, the study will motivate prospective researchers to use the current study constraints to conduct additional research on these particular subjects of interest.

Primarily, the study's objective is to examine the direct impact of CG determinants, such as audit committee size, CEO duality, insider ownership, institutional ownership, board independence, and board size, on TA activities of listed family firms on PSX from 2013 to 2022. The remaining paper is arranged as follows: Section two contains a literature review. Section three explains data collection and methodology. Section four reports the results of this study, and section five covers the conclusion.

2. Literature review

This section provides a sound base of empirical studies on the understudied variable's relationships to develop the hypothetical statements and the theoretical review.

2.1 Theoretical review

As Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed, agency theory is a widely used framework in organizational behavior, marketing, political science, finance, accounting, and economics, emphasizing that management should work in the shareholders' best interests for wealth maximization. The theory highlights the potential for conflicting goals between agents (management) and principals (shareholders), resulting in agency problems when agents prioritize their interests over shareholder wealth. CG-TA literature often relies on agency theory, linking effective monitoring and alignment of incentives to lower agency problems. However, the complexity of tax strategies and corporate transactions can hide resources from owners and tax authorities, fostering rent-seeking behavior by managers when strong governance is absent.

2.2 Hypothesis development

This section developed the hypothesis based on various empirical evidence and theoretical points of view. The board size is one factor that may encourage TA practices. TA is the attempt by taxpayers to lower their tax responsibilities in ways inconsistent with the objectives and intentions of those who enacted the applicable laws (Cabello et al., 2019; Choi & Park, 2022). According to Anggraenia and Kurnianto (2020), a BOD's primary duty is to supervise corporate management to increase the organization's efficacy and efficiency. An appropriate BOD size is crucial as it can affect various strategic decisions (Hoseini et al., 2019). The optimal number of members for BODs must be determined to ensure enough members to carry out its varied activities and tasks. Since conflicts of interest can arise in both government and business and increasing profits is in a company's best interest, a board of directors with high members with a broad range of expertise can discuss problems and possible solutions to resolve business difficulties and improve organizational performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and lessen the prevailing TA activities within the organization.

H1: Board size and TA are inversely related.

Shareholders delegate management and control functions to the Board of Directors (BODs), who, in turn, appoint agents to carry out these functions. This delegation of responsibility gives managers significant control, often leading to concerns that they might prioritize personal gain over shareholder wealth maximization, as described in the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, independent directors on the board are seen as a mechanism to mitigate this risk, being responsible for enhancing competition among management officials, ensuring the interests of shareholders are met, and that the board effectively monitors management (Fernández-Gago et al., 2018). Armstrong et al. (2015) found a negative relationship for companies with low TA, while those with high TA showed a positive board independence-TA relationship arguing that independent board members may lack the skill to directly impact a firm's tax policy. However, they can leverage their outside expertise and experience from dealing with other firms engaged in tax planning to shape a firm's tax policy in the interest of shareholders. Other studies have also explored the impact of CG mechanisms and firm-level characteristics, with some reporting a negative relationship between board independence and TA (Alluri and Mardini, 2020; Salhi et al., 2020). On the other hand, some scholars have found a positive relationship (Abdelfattah & Aboud, 2020; McClure et al., 2018).

H2: Board independence and TA are inversely related.

CEO duality is the practice of having one person hold two positions at the company, such as CEO and chairman of the board (Salhi et al., 2020). According to the followers of agency theory scholars, a CEO's dual positions could affect TA, financial strategy, and operational strategy by setting the "tone at the top" regarding the tax activities of the company. This, in turn, could encourage management to adopt a risk-averse attitude, which ultimately results in lower TA. Furthermore, integrating the management and leadership responsibilities of BOD aids in quantifying the level of tax aggressiveness (Tran et al., 2023). Badertscher et al. (2013) following the agency theory, which is based on the control and authorship separation mechanism, found an inverse relationship, arguing that companies with a greater degree of management and control will pay a smaller tax on income than enterprises with lower concentrations of ownership and control. This finding is further supported by research conducted by Armstrong et al. (2015), who examined a sample of manufacturing companies in Indonesia and found a negative relationship between CEO duality and TA. The exact relationship is also found by (Halioui et al., 2016; Kolias & Koumanakos, 2022).

H3: CEO duality and TA are inversely related.

In corporate governance, numerous studies have explored the impact of institutional ownership on TA, with a prevailing body of research suggesting a negative effect. Institutional investors, such as mutual and pension funds, often possess substantial corporate ownership stakes. While they may be able to influence corporate decisions, they tend to prioritize transparency and compliance with tax regulations to mitigate potential risks and maintain a favorable public image. Institutional investors, driven by their fiduciary duties to protect the interests of their beneficiaries, tend to favor strategies that minimize exposure to tax-related controversies and potential legal issues (Jiang et al., 2021). Consequently, corporations with higher institutional ownership are more likely to engage in conservative tax practices, resulting in reduced TA measures (Ying et al., 2017). This negative relationship is consistent with the idea that institutional investors act as monitors, discouraging aggressive TA strategies that could lead to adverse consequences for the companies they invest in.

H4: Institutional ownership and TA are inversely related.

TA behavior primarily depends on the decisions and actions of managers or representatives and the internal control mechanisms in place to monitor their choices. The audit committee is highlighted as a crucial CG mechanism for enhancing internal control, a monitoring tool that improves the quality of information disclosure to stakeholders (Khan et al., 2022; Kolias & Koumanakos, 2022). The literature reveals that specific characteristics of the audit committee, such as its size, gender composition, independence of members, meeting frequency, and the presence of accounting and finance specialists, play a significant role in deterring TA practices. The size of the audit committee is particularly emphasized, with a larger committee being associated with improved CG and a reduced likelihood of TA actions (Khan et al., 2015). Several scholars (Alfandia & Putri, 2023; Nguyen et al., 2022) have supported the argument that a larger audit committee helps prevent TA practices. Based on the agency theory and empirical evidence from the literature, the relationship between audit committee size and TA is hypothesized to be inverse.

H5: Audit size and TA are inversely related.

The relationship between insider ownership and TA has garnered significant attention in the CG literature. The agency theory provides a suitable framework to understand the potential impact of insider ownership on TA, arguing that insiders, particularly top executives and founders with significant ownership stakes, may prioritize their interests over those of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Such conflicts of interest can have profound implications for a firm's tax practices. The existing literature presents several arguments indicating a negative relationship between high levels of insider ownership and TA. Managers with substantial ownership stakes may be more risk-averse in their tax strategies, avoiding aggressive TA measures that could attract regulatory scrutiny (Jiang et al., 2021). Furthermore, in some cases, insider ownership can lead to the alignment of interests between shareholders and managers, encouraging a preference for tax policies that maximize shareholder value rather than prioritizing personal benefits (Alkurdi & Mardini, 2020). Moreover, insiders' deep emotional and financial connection to the firm may result in a more conservative approach to tax management, focusing on minimizing legal and reputational risks (Cabello et al., 2019).

H6: Insider ownership and TA are inversely related.

3. Methodology

The current study examines the causal relationship of CG-TA, considering the listed family-owned firms on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) between 2013 and 2022. PSX's official website and annual reports are used as the primary data collection sources for the understudied variables. The CG proxies used in the current study are audit committee size, CEO duality, insider ownership, institutional ownership, board independence, and board size, as operationalized in Table 1. Two primary proxies for estimating TA have been demonstrated in the literature: the difference between the actual and statutory tax rate (Jamei, 2017) is a direct way, and ETR is an indirect method (Khan et al., 2022; Sari et al., 2017). Both approaches can be used to estimate TA, but as the direct method is challenging to quantify, the indirect method has been employed in the literature extensively (Abdelfattah & Aboud, 2020; Jamei, 2017) because tax policies and company-adopted direct information are challenging to obtain since they are either secret, unlawful, sensitive, or bordering on illegality.

Furthermore, corporate tax rates are not disclosed in publicly accessible financial records. Consequently, the indirect method, which divides income tax expense by income before tax, is employed in the study to estimate the TA level. The researcher additionally makes use of some control factors, such as liquidity, firm age, company size, and leverage, in addition to these primary variables, as the use of control variables to assure model internal validity has been emphasized in the existing literature (Khan et al., 2022; Thuy et al., 2022).

The total number of family-owned firms selected for the study is 52, excluding financial firms consistent with (Sari et al., 2017), defaulted firms consistent with (Choi et al., 2013), firms with negative EBT consistent with (Choi & Park, 2022) and newly established firms after 2013. According to the existing literature, the researchers have applied three criteria to decide whether a company is family-owned. First, the researcher examined information from the respective companies' websites, which made it evident that they were family-owned. Additionally, the websites provided information about the government-owned firm, which further assisted the researcher in categorizing the company as non-family. In addition, businesses that belonged to a family company group (like Arif Habib and Younas brother group) were also regarded as family firms (Sikandar & Mahmood, 2018). Secondly, according to Latif et al. (2014), the researcher classifies a firm as a family if the CEO and owner are the same, the management team includes at least two family members or the CEO who succeeds the founder has a family connection or is related by blood. According to Khan et al. (2015), the third and final classification criteria support the idea that one family member should serve as chairperson, CEO, or board member in a family business.

Table 1: Variable's operationalization

Variables	**proxy**	**Reference**
Board size	Total directors in a year	(Khan et al., 2022)
Board independence	Independent directors /total directors	(Salhi et al., 2020)
CEO duality	One of the CEOs has a dual position; otherwise, zero	(Halioui et al., 2016; Kolias & Koumanakos, 2022)
Institutional shareholding	Institutional shares /total shares	(Jiang et al., 2021; Ying et al., 2017)
Audit size	Number of audit committee members	(Alfandia & Putri, 2023; Khan et al., 2015)
Insider shareholding	Director's shares /total shares	(Alkurdi & Mardini, 2020; Badertscher et al., 2013)
TA	Income tax expense /income before tax.	(Abdelfattah & Aboud, 2020; Khan et al., 2022)
Debt ratio	Total debt /total assets	(Jamie, 2017)
Financial leverage ratio	Total debt /total equity	(Khan et al., 2013)
Liquidity	Current assets /current liabilities	(Mahrani, 2019)
Firm age	Ln (1+total established years) in a particular year	(Habib & Hasan, 2017)
Firm size	LN (Total assets)	(Khan et al., 2013; Mahrani, 2019)

Source: Author generated

3.1 Estimation requirements and model specification

The established hypothesis on the relationships between CG-TA has led to the development of an econometric model, as shown by Equations 1.

TAi, t = $\beta 0$ + β_1(Institutional shareholding) i, t + $\beta 2$ (insider shareholding) i, t +β_3(Board size) i, t +β_4 (Board independence) i, t +β_5(CEO duality) i, t + β_6 (Audit committee size) i, t + β_7(Controls) i, t +ϵ ……... (1)

Correlation and the variance inflation factor (VIF) test are used to determine multicollinearity issues. Baltagi (2005) contends that a suitable panel data regression model is chosen based on the Hausman test, considering the data type as short due to the short period and the firm's number. A fixed effects model is chosen when the test statistic value is significant, whereas a random effects model is selected when the test statistic value is negligible. After verifying classical regression assumptions, the acquired results are compared with the expected hypothesis and theory to find consistency with the literature and suggest potential interpretations.

4. Data Analysis and Discussion of Results

The chapter presents the obtained results and a discussion to affirm the acceptance/rejection of the developed hypothesis per the study objectives.

4.1 Descriptive statistics

Descriptive statistics in Table 2 hold particular significance. For the dependent variable, the mean TA score of 0.22 suggests that family firms in the region are, on average, moderately inclined to engage in tax minimization strategies. This insight could be pertinent in understanding the tax planning practices employed by these businesses, which often face unique challenges and opportunities related to taxation in Pakistan.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Variables	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**
TA	0.22	0.16	0.00	0.99
Board size	8.12	1.69	6.00	18.00
Board independence	0.22	0.16	0.00	0.80
CEO duality	0.11	0.32	0.00	1.00
Institutional shareholding	20.30	17.34	0.00	64.42
Audit size	3.50	0.78	3.00	6.00
Insider shareholding	52.55	23.22	19.60	98.88
Firm size	22.65	1.58	16.66	26.13
Firm age	3.55	0.50	0.69	4.28
Liquidity	1.91	1.43	0.14	10.55
Debt ratio	0.45	0.17	0.02	0.79
Financial leverage	0.98	0.70	0.02	4.56

Source: Author generated

In the explanatory variable's context, the board size averaging at 8.12 highlights that family firms typically maintain relatively moderate-sized boards, which can be seen as a reflection of these businesses' more close-knit and familial nature. In contrast, board independence" with a mean of 0.22 signifies that, on average, family firms in Pakistan may have a limited degree of board independence, possibly due to a prevalence of family members on board directors. Most importantly, the high institutional shareholding mean of 20.30 underscores that institutional investors play a significant role in family-owned firms in Pakistan. This may signal a growing trend where family businesses are attracting external investment, possibly to fuel growth and enhance competitiveness. Lastly, insider shareholding averaging 52.55 reveals that family members or insiders have a substantial stake in these firms, a common characteristic of family-owned businesses. Such concentrated ownership often leads to more substantial family influence in decision-making and corporate direction.

4.2 Correlation matrix

As discussed before, two tests are conducted to check the presence/absence of multicollinearity in the understudied variables: correlation among explanatory variables and

Variance inflation factor (VIF). Table 3 results affirm the multicollinearity absence as the VIF score is less than five and correlation values are less than ± 0.70.

Table 3: Correlation matrix and VIF score

Variables	BS	BI	CEO duality	Inst	AS	Insd	VIF
BS	1.00						1.06
BI	0.08	1.00					1.04
CEO duality	-0.02	0.01	1.00				1.04
Inst	0.00	0.07	0.03	1.00			1.93
AS	0.19	-0.05	0.12	0.04	1.00		1.11
Insd	0.01	0.09	-0.04	-0.61	-0.24	1.00	1.95

Source: Author generated

Notes: BI=Board independence, BS= Board size, Inst=Institutional shareholding, AS=Audit size, Insd=Insider shareholding

4.3 Suitable regression model

First, to decide the most suitable regression model to test the CG-TA causal relationships, two main classical regression assumptions are tested, namely heteroskedastic and serial autocorrelation. Cook-Weisberg heteroskedasticity test statistics chi2(1) = 30.32 (Prob>chi2 = 0.0000) showing the heteroskedasticity issue while Wooldridge panel data autocorrelation test statistics F (1, 51) = 2.508 (Prob>F = 0.1195) confirm not autocorrelation issue. The Hausman test statistics chi2(11) = 8.47 (Prob>chi2 = 0.6703) reveal that the random effect model is appropriate. However, to control the heteroskedastic issue, a robust regression is run.

4.4 Hypothesis testing and discussion of results

The regression analysis presented in Table 4 examines the relationship between various CG proxies and TA in the context of Pakistan's family firms. The table reports the estimated beta coefficients for each CG proxy, their associated robust errors, and the expected sign of the relationship. The decision column indicates whether the existing literature and theoretical perspective support the expected sign of the relationship. The model is statistically significant as Wald chi2(11) = 31.56 with a Prob > chi2 = 0.0009 is statistically significant at less than one percent. The R-squared (between) is 0.2797, which shows that understudied CG proxies explain 27.97 percent variation in TA, and the remaining is because of unobserved factors. Along with the beta coefficients, parenthesizes have robust errors at three significance levels 99, 95, and 90 percent donated by ***, **, and * respectively.

The negative beta coefficient (-0.0108) for board size suggests that an increase in the size of the board of directors is associated with a decrease in TA. This relationship is statistically significant (*** p<0.01), supporting the expectation that larger boards promote greater transparency and better tax compliance within family firms in Pakistan. The result confirms the H1 acceptance is in line with agency theory and empirical evidence provided by (Cabello et al., 2019; Choi & Park, 2022). Furthermore, the positive beta coefficient (0.0503) for board independence indicates that a higher degree of independence is associated with increased TA. However, the result is not statistically significant. The result, in line with the findings of (Alluri and Mardini, 2020; Salhi et al., 2020), confirm the acceptance of H2. Additionally, the negative beta coefficient (-0.0194) for CEO duality suggests that firms with a single individual serving as CEO and board chair are likelier to engage in TA. This relationship is statistically significant, supporting the expectation of H3 that separating these roles may enhance transparency and reduce TA (Halioui et al., 2016; Kolias & Koumanakos, 2022).

Table 4: Hypothesis testing

CG proxies	Dependent variable = TA	Expected sign	Decision
Board size	-0.0108*** (0.00375)	-ve	Supported
Board independence	0.0503 (0.0370)	-ve	Supported
CEO duality	-0.0194 (0.0149)	-ve	Supported
Institutional shareholding	-0.000828 (0.000554)	-ve	Supported
Audit size	0.0166* (0.00867)	-ve	Not supported
Insider shareholding	-0.000566 (0.000515)	-ve	Supported
Debt ratio	-0.0571 (0.139)		
Liquidity	-0.00295 (0.00601)		
Financial leverage ratio	0.0545 (0.0371)		
Firm age	0.00859 (0.0280)		
Firm size	-0.00515 (0.00618)		
Constant	0.347** (0.173)		
R-Squared (Between)	0.2797		
Wald chi2(11)	31.56		
Prob > chi2	0.0009		

Source: Author generated

The negative beta coefficient (-0.000828) for institutional shareholding indicates that a higher proportion of institutional ownership is associated with reduced TA. This relationship is statistically significant, aligning with the expectation that institutional investors may exert pressure for better tax compliance. The result supports the developed hypothesis H4 in line with (Jiang et al., 2021; Ying et al., 2017). Contrary to the expected sign, the positive beta coefficient (0.0166) for audit size suggests that larger audit firms are associated with increased TA. However, the result is inconsistent with the developed hypothesis H5 but aligns with the findings of (Mahrani, 2019). Additionally, the negative beta coefficient (-0.000566) for insider shareholding indicates that a higher proportion of insider ownership is associated with reduced TA. This relationship is statistically significant, supporting the expectation that insiders have an interest in minimizing tax risks leading towards the acceptance of H6 in line with (Cabello et al., 2019; Jiang et al., 2021), who contend that insiders' deep emotional and financial connection to the firm may result in a more conservative approach to tax management, focusing on minimizing legal and reputational risks.

5. Conclusion

This study investigated the CG-TA causal relationship in family-owned firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) over the period from 2013 to 2022. The research used data from the PSX official website and annual reports to focus on various CG proxies and TA estimation methods. The regression analysis, employing a random effects model while accounting for heteroskedasticity tested various hypotheses. The results demonstrated that certain aspects of CG significantly influence TA practices in family-owned firms. Specifically, board size, CEO duality, institutional shareholding, and insider shareholding were found to have an inverse relationship with TA. This implies that family-owned firms with larger boards, separate CEO and chairperson roles, increased institutional investor presence, and reduced insider shareholding tend to engage in less TA. Notably, the size of the audit committee did not significantly impact TA, and other control variables showed no significant relationships with TA.

5.1 Implications of the study

The study's findings hold crucial implications for CG and TA strategies in family-owned firms listed on the PSX, with relevance for policymakers, business leaders, and stakeholders aiming to promote transparent and ethical financial practices. **With respect to theoretical implications**, the study highlights the substantial influence of CG on TA, emphasizing that factors such as board size, CEO-chairman role separation, institutional shareholding, and insider ownership play critical roles in shaping tax practices. Encouraging the expansion of board size and role separation can reduce TA while attracting institutional investors can enhance transparency and governance. The findings **with respect to practical implications** stress the importance of diversified ownership structures to mitigate potential conflicts of interest within family-owned firms. While audit committee size did not significantly impact TA, the study underscores the importance of influential audit committees for financial transparency. In summary, these implications underscore that improving governance through strategies like board enlargement, role separation, attracting institutional investors, and reducing insider ownership can foster transparency and ethical financial conduct, ultimately enhancing corporate reputation and sustainable growth.

5.2 Limitations and Future Directions

While the study provides valuable insights into the causal CG-TA relationship among family-owned firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange, it is essential to acknowledge some limitations and suggest potential future directions for research in this area. First, the study's focus on family-owned firms may limit the generalizability of its findings to other types of organizations. Future research could explore how CG practices impact TA in different corporate settings, such as non-family-owned or multinational corporations. Second, the study employs an indirect method to estimate TA through the effective tax rate (ETR). While this approach is commonly used due to the challenges of obtaining direct tax policy and company-specific information, it may not capture the full complexity of TA strategies. Future studies could delve deeper into firms' specific mechanisms and strategies to engage in TA. Third, the research primarily analyzes data from 2013-2022, and the dynamic nature of tax regulations and CG practices suggests that the findings might evolve. This study does not delve into the cultural and contextual factors that may influence CG and TA practices in Pakistan. A more comprehensive examination of the cultural and institutional context could provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics at play.

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